dependent probability weighting functions of the inverse-s shape discussed by Quiggin (1982) and advocated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and other scholars. I believe Hilton (1989) first showed that certainty equivalents have some unexpected properties under random EU; additionally, recent work by Navarro-Martinez et al. (2015) contains a strong suggestion of my direction here. In my conclusion I discuss implications of this finding more thoroughly, but it seems that elicited certainty equivalents cannot nonparametrically identify preferences, at least not in the mainstream econometric sense of the phrase "nonparametric identification," since their conditional expectation depends on the source and nature of their variability.
Years ago Karni and Safra (1987) observed that, from the perspective of rankdependent preference theory, incentive-compatible elicitation of certainty equivalents might not be possible; at the same time, many behavioral economists doubt that incentive compatibility matters much for preference elicitation (Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Loewenstein 1999) , though for many kinds of value elicitation there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary (Harrison and Rutström 2008) . Let me firmly distinguish my findings from the concerns of Karni and Safra, and also stipulate (for argument 's sake) what the behavioral mainstream believes about methods. My formal results require only general assumptions about elicitation methods, and say nothing about incentive compatibility. The results come first, followed by some intuition behind the results, and I close with some caveats and implications of the results.
Formal results.
Consider simple prospects = ( , ) with money outcomes = > 0 with probability and = 0 with probability 1 − . Simple prospects figure prominently in theoretical and empirical discussions of rank-dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT) because their certainty equivalents are thought to reveal the probability weighting function of the rank-dependent family when the utility or value of outcomes is linear (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Prelec 1998) . To see this, let the utility or value of outcomes have the power form ( ) = 1/ , where I write the power as 1/ for convenience. Given any specific ∈ (0, ∞), the rank-dependent utility or RDU of will be = ( | ) ( ) + �1 − ( | )� (0) = ( , ) 1/ , where ( | ) is a probability weighting function depending on preference parameters . The certainty equivalent of = ( , ), given , is then ( | ) , but divide these by to free them of dependence on and let ( | , ) ≡ ( | ) be the RDU normalized certainty equivalent of any simple prospect (given specific and ). Notice that when = 1 (that is for a linear value of outcomes), one has ( |1, ) ≡ ( | ) so that these normalized certainty equivalents of simple prospects are thought to reveal the RDU weighting function when = 1. Expected utility or EU is the special case where ( | ) ≡ , so also define ( | ) ≡ as the EU normalized certainty equivalent of any simple prospect (given specific ).
Let c be an observed certainty equivalent for = ( , ), elicited from some subject and divided by to normalize it. Very commonly, the empirical specification for these observed certainty equivalents is = ( | ) + . Here ( | ) is the conditional expectation function or c.e.f. of , usually derived from EU, RDU, CPT or another preference functional (as done above); and is an error term, usually thought to arise (for instance) from "carelessness, hurrying, or inattentiveness" (Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper 2010) and assumed to satisfy conventional assumptions ( ( ) = ( | ) = 0). Estimation of ( | )
can then proceed using nonlinear least squares or another estimator such as maximum likelihood. This is the essence of the standard model approach.
Standard model RDU assumes that ( | ) = ( | , ) ≡ ( | ) , where is a nonrandom parameter to be estimated. Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper (2010) use maximum likelihood this way, while Tversky and Kahneman (1992) use nonlinear least squares. In other words, the conditional expectation of is taken to be ( | ) , and the data analyst's job is to estimate unique and fixed parameters and from multiple observations of observed under experimentally varied values of . Obviously ∈ [0,1], so a few other modeling assumptions appropriate to limited dependent variables are needed: The distribution of cannot be wholly independent of unless it is degenerate. But this can be done while keeping ( | ) = 0 in straightforward ways (see e.g. Gonzalez and Wu 1999; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper 2010 and contemporary random preference theory seems to be confined to treatment of as random only (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer 2006; Apesteguia and Ballester 2016) . Therefore, all of my random preference analysis treats only as the realization of a random variable , taking any weighting function parameters as fixed within the subject.
I confine my analysis of the random model to the random EU special case. In any given trial of any elicitation, an ordinary random EU assumes that a new realization of occurs and determines the normalized certainty equivalent ( | ) = . Assume that a probability density function ( | ) of with support (0, ∞) lies within an individual, depending on parameters . Then define ( | ) as random RDU model, and later I will return to this), but additionally indicates that the results below do not depend much on the specific laboratory method used to elicit a certainty equivalent. The two key assumptions about any elicitation method are (1) that repeated trials using the method yield variability in elicited certainty equivalents, and (2) this variability is consistent with the assumptions of a random EU model-namely, that ( ) is independent of . Note that neither of those assumptions rule out any dependence of ( | ) on the elicitation method . The close resemblance of these two models suggests two possible types of mimicry.
First, since ( |1, ) ≡ ( | ) in standard RDU, it will be troubling if ( | ) can "look like" a stereotypical ( | ), that is, can have properties like those that scholars believe are empirically characteristic of RDU weighting functions. I will refer to this as weak mimicry (of standard RDU by random EU). Second, it may happen that for some well-known and specific ( | ), there exists a specific ( | ) such that ( | ) is a re-parameterization of ( | , ). Let be the set of possible parameter vectors ( , ), and let Ψ be the set of possible parameter vectors ; and suppose that, for some ( | ), there exists a function
Then one may say there is strong mimicry (of standard RDU by random EU) for ( | ). Notice that strong mimicry implies weak mimicry but not vice versa.
Since −ln( ) > 0 ∀ ∈ (0,1), so that > 0 too, the final integral in eq. 1 is the one- make it simple to derive various examples of ( | ), using the relationship
It's widely known that this has the Laplace transform ℒ{ }( ) = (1 + ) − , implying that
Figure 1-A shows this Gamma c.e.f. for = 0.75 and =2.79. At these parameter choices, it has the "inverse-s" shape many believe is characteristic of weighting functions ( | ) and the fixed point ≈ −1 which is also characteristic of Prelec's (1998) 1-parameter weighting function; so this is an instance of weak mimicry. One needs to say that this Gamma c.e.f. can (not must) weakly mimic this characteristic shape. Figure 1 -B shows the Gamma c.e.f. for = 0.75 and =0.9: Here we see the "Optimist" shape discussed by Quiggin (1982) , and also the plurality shape of individually estimated weighting functions in Wilcox (2015) . Such shape flexibility is also characteristic of 2-parameter weighting functions found in the literature on RDU and CPT, where this flexibility is usually regarded as a feature rather than a weakness. Example 2. Suppose X has the Inverse Gaussian (Wald) p.d.f.
� for , and ∈ (0, ∞). Earlier I noted that in the case of the Prelec (1998) 2-parameter weighting function,
This has the Laplace transform ℒ{
Clearly, this is identical to eq. 4 if we set = and require that = 1 2 ⁄ . This is very close to being a case of strong mimicry, but not quite, since eq. 4 can only mimic the Prelec weighting function when just happens to be 1 2 ⁄ .
Empirically, estimates of have a wider range than a small neighborhood of 1 2 ⁄ .
However, this result for the Lévy distribution provides a strong and fruitful hint. The , so we have strong mimicry of the 2-parameter Prelec (1998) function, provided that < 1. Since this is both characteristic of most empirical estimates of and indeed yields the characteristic inverse-s shape, this is strong mimicry of a well-known and widely used probability weighting function in the relevant part of the parameter space.
Intuition.
To see the intuition behind the formal results, it helps to return to the more usual representation of the power utility function, that is ( ) = , thinking now of as having a distribution with support Σ ⊆ (0, ∞) under the random preference model. Then under EU the normalized certainty equivalent of a simple prospect (given any value of ) will be 1⁄ , whose second derivative with respect to is
As approaches zero, eq. 7 shows that the normalized certainty equivalent 1⁄ approaches being convex in at all ∈ (0, ∞). If Σ is in fact bounded above, there must be sufficiently small p such that 1⁄ is convex ∀ ∈ Σ: In that event, Jensen's Inequality
� > for sufficiently small . That is, mean normalized certainty equivalents will exceed when is small enough: We have apparent overweighting of small (enough) probabilities if the support of is bounded above.
As approaches 1, on the other hand, eq. 7 shows that 1⁄ becomes concave at almost all , and the argument above flips around: If Σ is bounded below away from zero, there will be p sufficiently close to 1 such that 1⁄ is concave ∀ ∈ Σ, and Jensen's Inequality
. Again setting ( ) = 1, we have � 1⁄ � < for sufficiently close to one. That is, mean normalized certainty equivalents will fall short of when is high enough: We have apparent underweighting of high (enough) probabilities if the support of is bounded below away from zero. Figure 3 illustrates this intuition. Assume that the agent has a binomial distribution on such that ( ) = 1: Specifically she has = 0.5 with probability 2 3 ⁄ and = 2 with probability 1 3 ⁄ . Figure 3 shows 
This says that for any given individual, the coefficient of variation of −ln( ) will be equivalent to the coefficient of variation of and, moreover, independent of the particular W and of any simple prospect ( , ), regardless of whether the weighting function is an identity function (EU) or not (RDU). This immediately suggests a test of both random preference EU and RDU based on multiple (more than two) certainty equivalent elicitation trials for several different simple prospects. To my knowledge, such data are scarce but more could be gathered with appropriate experimental designs. The key point, however, is that for certainty equivalents, the random preference hypothesis can make strong refutable predictions about higher moments that are independent of the form or even the presence of any rank-dependent weighting function. Whether the same can be said of the standard model is unclear to me. However, meaningful preference measurement may not be possible without strong assumptions concerning the random part of decision behavior (Wilcox 2008; Blavatskyy and Pogrebna 2010; Wilcox 2011; Apesteguia and Ballester 2016) . Many scholars say that elicited certainty equivalents, or quantities that are argued to be estimated certainty equivalents, permit "nonparametric" identification and estimation of preferences (Gonzales and Wu 1999; Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv 2007) . The word "nonparametric" gets used in many different ways, but many authors divide discussion of models in two parts: (1) a conditional expectation function, or perhaps a conditional median function, and (2) the error, the random part that remains once such a function has been removed in a way that makes the expectation of the error zero. Generally, in the preference measurement literature, scholars who say their estimation is "nonparametric" mean that they are making relatively few assumptions about the form of preference entities (utilities or values, and probability weights, and so forth) that appear in a c.e.f. However, they routinely make a strong assumption about the random part of observed behavior, and I showed that this assumption is critically consequential.
The essence of this strong but implicit assumption is that the c.e.f. has an obvious interpretation-the intended interpretation being that of algebraic (deterministic) decision theory. Hendry and Morgan (2005, p. 23) argue that when we speak of model identification,
we have things in mind beyond the original Cowles Foundation meaning-including "correspondence to the desired entity" and "satisfying the assumed interpretation (usually of a theory model)." Estimation of preferences from elicited certainty equivalents is now complicated in just these senses. We cannot take the standard model for granted, and under a random preference model, the c.e.f. in part reflects the underlying distribution of preferences within the individual, in ways that can mimic the "desired entity"-in the case discussed here, the preference entity called the probability weighting function. I do not know whether certainty equivalents can nonparametrically identify such entities: This question needs a good answer. However, at this time there is certainly no clear presumption that elicited certainty equivalents dominate elicited discrete choices as a basis for estimation of preference. Both kinds of data seem to require strong assumptions for meaningful estimation of preference entities.
Appendix: A brief Monte Carlo illustration of the problem (and a possible solution).
Simulated data sets for this brief Monte Carlo analysis of several estimation methods are based on the experimental design of Gonzalez and Wu (1999) . Certainty equivalents were elicited from their subjects for = 1, 2, … , 165 distinct two-outcome prospects = ( , ℎ ; 1 − , ). These were constructed by fully crossing 15 distinct pairs of high and low outcomes (ℎ , ) with 11 distinct probabilities of receiving the high outcome ℎ (and corresponding probabilities 1 − of receiving the low outcome ). The probabilities are .05, .10, .25, .40, .50, .60, .75, .90, .95, .99) ; the high and low outcome pairs are Each simulated subject = 1, 2, … 1000 is given random EU preferences. Each subject is endowed with parameters and of the Gamma distribution p.d.f. as given in Example 1 of Section 1. The parameter is drawn once for each subject from a Lognormal distribution with mean ( ) = 0.75 and variance V( ) ≈ 0.16 to provide some subject heterogeneity; the parameter is then set to the value (given the drawn ) such that
This endows each random EU agent with a c.e.f.
having the fixed point −1 as is characteristic of the 1-parameter Prelec (1998) weighting function, but also creates heterogeneity in the degree of curvature of the subject c.e.f.s.
Then, for each subject , for each prospect , a new is independently drawn from the Gamma distribution with that subject's parameters and , and these create simulated elicited certainty equivalents
� for Monte Carlo study. This is the "Random EU data."
For comparison it is also useful to have simulated "Standard EU data." To construct this data, each simulated subject s is endowed with a fixed value , drawn once for each subject variance. This estimation method is inspired by Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper (2010) , but I will always estimate at the individual subject level whereas they estimated finite mixture models of the subject population and included prospect-specific error variance terms (which cannot be done in the case of individual estimation). I'll call this method ML-M-C (for "maximum likelihood, money errors, common parameterization"). The power utility function, combined with some 2-parameter weighting function, is quite common in the literature on risk preference estimation.
The third method writes an estimating equation in utility rather than money terms, and the parameterizations of and are maximally expansive. There are nine distinct outcomes in the experiment, so there are nine distinct values of ( ). Since the RDU value function is an interval scale, though, one can choose (0) = 0 and (800) = 1, leaving seven unique and distinct values of ( ) as seven parameters to estimate. Similarly, the eleven distinct probabilities in the experiment become eleven distinct parameters ( ) to estimate. Now linearly interpolate ( ) from the parameters ( ) in the following manner. Let ( ) and ( ) be the least upper bound and greatest lower bound (among the nine outcomes in the experiment) on , and let their values be given by the parameter values
is a linear interpolation of ( ). This method then assumes that the c.e.f. of � ( ) is the RDU of prospect , that is ( � ( )| , ) = ( ) (ℎ ) + �1 − ( )� ( ), and one may then think of � ( ) − ( � ( )| , ) as a "utility error." Following Wilcox (2011) , assume the variance of these utility errors is proportional to
is a weighted utility error that becomes the object of nonlinear least squares estimation. I call this the NLS-U-E estimation (for "nonlinear least squares, utility errors, expansive parameterization"). It is inspired by Gonzalez and Wu's (1999) estimation method, though there are several differences between their method and this one (see Gonzalez and Wu 199, , for details). the same form as the errors in the first two methods, the fact that we wish to estimate a conditional median function (rather than a c.e.f.) implies that least squares is not the appropriate estimator: Rather, we want a least absolute deviation or LAD estimator.
Combined with the same lean parameterization used for the first method, I call this the LAD-M-L estimation (for "least absolute deviation, money errors, lean parameterization").
With the exception of the NLS-U-E estimation method, the well-known simplex algorithm of Nelder and Mead (1965) was used to optimize objective functions. For the NLS-U-E estimation method, I imposed monotonicity constraints on the estimated ( ) and ( ) (one difference versus Gonzalez and Wu 1999) None of these four estimation methods are bias-free for both the Standard EU and Random EU data sets, and this is the primary finding of this appendix. The method NLS-U-E is biased towards finding inverse-s probability weighting for both data sets: In the case of the Standard EU data I suspect this is because this method is just too parametrically expansive for the sample size. By contrast, the NLS-M-L and ML-M-C methods are virtually unbiased for Standard EU data, while they show the predicted bias when applied to the Random EU data. As speculated, the LAD-M-L method provides unbiased (and astonishingly tight) estimates for the Random EU data, but displays a pronounced bias in the Standard EU data in a direction opposite to inverse-s probability weighting. In sum, none of these four estimation methods are robust to the underlying source of randomness in the data generating process. 
